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Abstract
Chimpanzees and orangutans are able to generate innovative behaviors to solve complicated physical problems. For exam-
ple, when presented with an out-of-reach peanut at the bottom of a vertical tube (floating peanut task—FPT), some of them 
spontaneously spit water into the tube until the peanut floats to the top. Yet, it is unclear whether this innovative solution 
results from repeating those actions that bring the peanut incrementally closer to the top or from anticipating the solution 
before acting. In the current study, we addressed this question by presenting three naïve orangutans with an opaque version 
of the FPT that prevented them from obtaining visual information about the effect of their actions on the position of the 
peanut. One of the subjects solved the opaque FPT in the very first trial: he collected water from the faucet and poured it 
into the opaque tube repeatedly until the hitherto non-visible peanut reached the top. This provides evidence for the first 
time that orangutans can potentially solve the FPT without relying on sensorimotor learning, but to some extent by mentally 
representing the problem.
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Introduction
Great apes are proficient physical problem solvers that show 
high innovation rates in their tool use behavior compared 
to other nonhuman primates (Reader and Laland 2003). 
Innovation is usually referred to as the ability to invent new 
behaviors or use behaviors that are already part of one’s 
repertoire in a new way to solve unknown problems (Kum-
mer and Goodall 1985). A novel solution may nevertheless 
result from a variety of cognitive processes, not necessarily 
mutually exclusive (Reader and Laland 2003), ranging from 
different types of sensorimotor mechanisms (e.g., trial-and-
error learning, perceptual-motor feedback) to insight (Köhler 
1926; Thorpe 1956) or mental combinations in Piagetian 
terms (i.e., mentally representing the problem and imag-
ining both the solution and the sequence of means-action; 
Doré and Dumas 1987). Insight and mental combinations 
rely necessarily on some understanding of the causal rela-
tions involved in the problem that is activated before acting, 
whereas sensorimotor mechanisms mainly depend on the 
feedback generated by physically acting on the problem. 
Sensorimotor mechanisms can range from blind trial-and 
error to more sophisticated forms of operant conditioning 
and causal learning (which imply some understanding of 
the spatiotemporal relationships involved) (Skinner 1974; 
Thorndike 1911). The question of which cognitive mecha-
nisms are responsible for innovative problem solving in great 
apes is still a matter of debate (Ramsey et al. 2007).
Mendes et al. (2007) designed a suitable task to explore 
innovation and pinpoint its underlying cognitive mechanisms 
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in great apes: the floating peanut task (hereafter FPT). In 
this task, subjects are presented with a vertically oriented 
tube that contains an out-of-reach peanut at its bottom. The 
solution to this problem consists of pouring water into the 
tube so that the peanut floats upward until it reaches the 
tube opening. In the original study (Mendes et al. 2007), 
the peanut was already floating in a small amount of water 
inside a transparent tube (out of reach from the subject), and 
all five orangutans tested acquired the solution (i.e., collect-
ing water from the faucets and spitting it into the tube) in 
the very first trial. Both the sudden appearance of the spit-
ting behavior (which replaced previous ineffective actions) 
and the fact that it was only displayed to extract the peanut 
from the tube (compared to control conditions) suggest that 
orangutans engaged in insightful problem solving. Neverthe-
less, two features of the task precluded us from ruling out 
alternative explanations based on sensorimotor processes. 
First, the initial state of the problem (an object floating in 
water) provided information about its solution. That is, one 
can potentially solve the task by rearranging the key ele-
ments that were already present without engaging in genuine 
innovation. However, subsequent studies using a dry tube 
-thus removing the initial perceptual cues- debunked this 
interpretation (DeLong et al. 2020; Ebel et al. 2019b; Hanus 
et al. 2011). Some naïve chimpanzees and orangutans were 
able to solve the dry version of the FPT.
Second, and more important, the transparent tube allowed 
the individuals to visually monitor the effect of their spitting 
behavior on the position of the floating object. Therefore, 
subjects could have solved the transparent-tube task by some 
form of instrumental learning (i.e., repeating those actions 
that bring the reward incrementally closer), and not neces-
sarily by means of mental combinations prior to action. As 
pointed out by Mendes et al. (2007) in the original study, a 
conclusive way to identify which cognitive mechanism may 
underlie the solution process in the FPT is presenting an 
opaque tube to naïve subjects that prevents them from seeing 
how their spitting responses positively affect the reward’s 
position. Recently, Ebel et al. (2019b) used the opaque ver-
sion of the FPT in a series of experiments with great apes. 
None of the naïve subjects spontaneously solved the opaque 
task. However, success could be promoted by previously 
experiencing one of two sensorimotor scenarios (Ebel et al. 
2019b). First, most of the subjects who succeeded in the 
dry transparent version of the FPT maintained the solution 
in the opaque version. Even the orangutans tested in the 
original study (Mendes et al. 2007) were able to transfer 
the solution, acquired 9 years earlier with the transparent 
quarter-filled water tube, to the opaque tube. Evidence 
for solution transference from simpler to more complex 
but analogous problems was also gathered from studies 
addressing other physical problems (e.g., Manrique et al. 
2013). For instance, Völter and Call (2012) presented great 
apes a series of string-pulling tasks that varied in the visual 
access the subjects had to the different elements relevant 
for the solution process. Results show that when faced with 
complex problems, great apes only succeeded after a brief 
visual exposure to the effect of their actions in the solu-
tion process, but could maintain the solution afterwards in 
visually restricted versions of the task. Whether or not this 
is the result of the subjects identifying the common causal 
structure of both problems (simple and complex versions) 
needs further investigation. An alternative explanation is that 
the subjects repeated an action that worked in the past when 
facing the new task.
The second relevant finding of Ebel et al. (2019b) was 
the successful performance of a chimpanzee after observ-
ing an end-state demonstration in which the reward (pea-
nut) was already floating atop the opaque tube within easy 
reach. Crucially, in this case, the solution was not acquired 
by perceptual-motor feedback. One possible (albeit specu-
lative) explanation is that the individual tried to reproduce 
the observed result by generating new actions and anticipat-
ing their effect on the peanut’s position. In line with this 
interpretation, Tennie et al. (2010) found that chimpanzees 
could solve the transparent FPT apparently by attending to 
the end-state of the task produced by others, and spontane-
ously using their own means.
Altogether, these findings suggest that the great apes’ 
success in the FPT may not be only due to instrumental 
learning or entirely controlled by sensorimotor processes. 
Rather, it seems that great apes may use the sensorimotor 
information to generate a basic knowledge of the means-
end relationships and physical properties of the task, 
which can be subsequently applied to similar problems. 
However, it is still unclear whether great apes can solve 
the FPT by mentally representing the effect of spitting 
water into an opaque tube without previously witnessing 
the effect. In the current study, we addressed this question 
by presenting three naïve orangutans with the opaque ver-
sion of the FPT that prevented them from obtaining visual 
information about the task (same apparatus as in Ebel et al. 
2019b). Unlike previous FPT studies, this study involved a 
fixed sequence of conditions of decreasing difficulty (i.e., 
from less to more visual information available regarding 
the tube’s content). This was done to ensure that success 
in more cognitively demanding FPT conditions was not 
due to transferring the solution from simpler versions. All 
subjects started with the opaque tube (opaque condition) 
and were subsequently presented with the transparent dry 
tube (dry condition). Success in the opaque condition 
would provide the first evidence that orangutans can solve 
the task without sensorimotor feedback, thus raising the 
possibility that individuals used mental re-combination to 
produce the solution. Subjects who failed in the opaque or 
dry tasks were then presented with a wet task, identical to 
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the original transparent quarter-filled water tube (Mendes 
et al. 2007). If subjects solve the problem in the wet but 
not the dry condition, it would indicate that the presence of 
the floating peanut facilitated the solution. We ran a series 
of control conditions to assess whether subjects spat water 
indiscriminately into the tube regardless of the presence 
and/or position of the peanut. Crucially, we also included 
a control condition (dry-control) identical to the dry condi-
tion described above, to confirm that apes can transfer the 
successful sequence of actions to a more complex version 




Three male orangutans housed at the Madrid Zoo (Spain) 
participated in the present study: Dahi (Pongo pygmaeus), 
and Ron and Tom (both P. pygmaeus x P. abelii hybrids), 
aged 10, 16, and 19 years, respectively. However, Tom 
(the flanged male) was withdrawn from the study due to 
his general lack of interest in the task. All subjects were 
housed in indoor-outdoor enclosures equipped with vari-
ous enrichment structures (e.g., climbing frames, ropes, 
natural vegetation, water sources). Subjects were naïve to 
the task or any other experimental procedure. They par-
ticipated voluntarily in the study and were not food- or 
water- deprived during the test. The experiment took place 
in their sleeping rooms where no tools were available.
Materials
Two tubes were used in this study. The opaque tube 
(long = 26 cm; Ø = 5 cm) was closed at both ends and 
had a single hole (Ø ≈ 3 cm) near its top part (same as 
in Ebel et al. 2019b). Crucially, the size and position of 
the hole precluded the subjects from visually monitoring 
the peanut until it reached the hole. The transparent tube 
(long = 26 cm; Ø = 5 cm) was open at its top end (same as 
in Mendes et al. 2007). Depending on condition, either the 
opaque or the transparent tube was vertically attached to 
the bars of the sleeping room by metal bracelets at a dis-
tance of approx. 1.5 m from the water faucet. The faucets 
have been in the sleeping rooms since its construction, and 
subjects used them on a regular basis. There was no visual 
contact between the tested subject and other conspecifics.
Procedure
Experimental conditions
Orangutans were first presented with the opaque condition, 
followed by the dry condition (see Supplementary file 1, 
Fig. 1 for a schematic drawing of experimental conditions). 
Each experimental condition consisted of four 25-min tri-
als held in different days. The opaque trials began with the 
experimenter dropping the peanut into the dry opaque tube 
in full view of the subject. In this condition, the subjects 
were not able to use any visual cues to monitor the peanut 
inside the tube. In contrast, in the dry condition, the peanut 
was already inside the transparent dry tube and each dry 
trial began when the subject entered the room. Subjects who 
failed to retrieve the peanut in the opaque and dry conditions 
were tested in the wet-experimental condition that matched 
exactly the original FPT used in Mendes et al. 2007 study 
(i.e., a transparent tube filled with a quarter of water and the 
peanut floating inside but out of reach). The wet-experimen-
tal condition consisted of four 2-min trials administered on 
different days.
Control conditions
We administered four different control conditions: wet-
control, top, table, and dry-control (see Supplementary file 
1,Fig. 2 for a schematic drawing of control conditions). The 
wet-control condition was only presented to subjects who 
went through the wet-experimental condition and consisted 
of the very same water-filled transparent tube but without a 
peanut inside. This was done to assess whether the spitting 
behavior was exclusively due to the presence of water. The 
procedure and number of trials for the wet-control condition 
were the same as for the wet-experimental one. We coun-
terbalanced the order of presentation of both wet conditions 
across subjects. The top, table, and dry-control conditions 
were administered at the end of the experiment to all sub-
jects regardless of their performance in experimental con-
ditions (same control conditions as in Mendes et al. 2007). 
In the top condition, a peanut was attached to the top of the 
transparent tube, and was thus within easy reach of the sub-
ject. This was done to rule out that subjects’ spitting behav-
ior was triggered by the mere presence of the tube. In the 
table condition, a peanut rested on a table that was located 
outside the cage, and 31 cm away from the transparent tube 
and thus subjects could not reach it. We presented this condi-
tion to assess whether subjects’ spitting behavior was trig-
gered by a frustration effect. The dry-control condition was 
identical to the dry condition except that each dry-control 
trial took 2 min. We included the dry-control condition to 
test whether subjects that only managed to get the peanut 
on the wet test condition would solve the task without the 
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presence of water inside. Each of these control conditions 
involved four 2-min trials. Table, top and dry-control trials 
were grouped into four 3-trial blocks held in different days. 
Order of presentation within and between blocks was coun-
terbalanced across subjects.
Coding and analyses
All sessions were videotaped. For each trial, we coded 
whether and when the subjects solved the task (i.e., retrieved 
the peanut), as well as the latency to first spit into the tube 
and the time elapsed between successive water spits. Addi-
tionally, we scored the frequency of tube-directed actions 
that were ineffective for solving the task: hand/foot actions 
(pulling, lifting, banging) and mouth actions (biting, lick-
ing). A second coder coded 33% of the trials. Inter-observer 
reliability was excellent for all measurements (Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient: latencies to success, r = 1.00; laten-
cies to spit, r = 1.00; number of spits, r = 1.00; tube-directed 
actions, r = .95).
Results
The two orangutans succeeded in retrieving the peanut from 
the tube, albeit in different conditions. Dahi acquired the 
solution in the very first trial of the opaque condition and 
continued to succeed in all the following experimental ses-
sions (four opaque and four dry sessions). Ron failed to solve 
the task during the opaque and dry conditions, and there-
fore was presented with the wet conditions. He managed to 
get the peanut in the first wet-experimental trial, and only 
needed one trial to succeed during the dry-control condition.
For Dahi, the time required to solve the problem 
decreased exponentially across sessions (y = x−0.94, adjusted 
R2 = .87, F8 = 53.73, p < .001; see Fig.  1a). It took him 
1446 s to get the peanut for the first time, but only 154 s on 
average in the subsequent experimental sessions (latency 
range = 85–254 s). Dahi’s latency to first spit water into 
the tube also decreased sharply across sessions (y = x−0.89, 
R2 = .76, F8 = 25.94, p = .001, see Fig. 1a). Crucially, once 
the spitting behavior appeared for the first time, the fre-
quency of tube-directed (hand/foot and mouth) actions 
declined dramatically, while the inter-spit latencies short-
ened (Supplementary file 2, Table S1). In particular, Dahi 
displayed a total of 50 tube-directed actions in the first trial, 
but only an average of 3.43 actions (frequency range = 0–7 
actions) in the following experimental trials. Regarding the 
spitting pattern, the time lag between the first spit and the 
retrieval of the reward was 937 s in the first trial, but only 
111 s on average (latency range = 45–232 s) in the subse-
quent trials. Dahi needed 4 water spits to get the reward for 
the first time and 3–4 water spits in the remaining experi-
mental trials (Supplementary file 2, Table S1).
Surprisingly, Dahi only got the reward in the first dry-
control condition (latency to get the reward: 149 s), but not 
in the remaining three dry-control trials. Yet, he spat water 
into the tube during the first three dry-control trials, and 
overall, added more water in the dry-control (mean = 1.75, 
total = 7 spits) compared with the table (mean = 0) and top 
(mean = 0.5, total = 2 spits) conditions. Throughout the 
course of the experiment, Dahi seemed to lose motivation 
to engage in the task. When arriving at the control phase, he 
often walked away from the tube and stayed at some distance 
from the experimental setup.
Ron did not add water into the tube during the opaque 
and dry conditions. In fact, he displayed very few actions 
toward the tube across the experimental conditions (Opaque: 
mean = 5, range = 1–9 actions; Dry: mean = 1, range = 0–4 
actions). However, he managed to solve the task in the first 
Fig. 1  Latencies to first spit and getting the reward and frequency of (hand, foot, and mouth) manipulations for a Dahi across the opaque and dry 
trials, and b Ron across the wet- and dry-control trials
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trial of the wet-experimental condition. When presented 
with the dry-control condition, Ron spat water into the tube 
during the first trial, but was only successful from the second 
trial onwards (Dry control: mean = 80 s, range = 68–97 s). As 
for Dahi, the time needed to get the reward decreased expo-
nentially across wet- and dry-control sessions (y = x−0.96, 
R2 = .91, F7 = 70.17, p < .001, see Fig. 1b): from 228 s in 
the first wet trial to an average of 84 s in the remaining ones 
(latency range = 56–132 s). Moreover, whereas in the first 
wet trial the time lag between Ron’s first spit and the retrieval 
of the reward was 97 s, in the remaining successful trials, he 
only needed 32 s on average (latency range = 8–64 s). Simi-
larly, the latencies to first spit decreased exponentially over 
time (y =  x−0.94, R2 = .87, F8 = 52.10, p < .001). Ron required 
1 water spit to get the reward for the first time during the 
second wet-experimental trial, and 1–3 water spits in the 
remaining wet-experimental and dry-control trials (Supple-
mentary file 2, Table S1). Regarding the tube-directed (hand/
foot and mouth) manipulations, in contrast with Dahi, we 
did not find a clear pattern of before-after decline once Ron 
found the solution (Supplementary file 2, Table S1). Ron 
produced few actions during the opaque and dry conditions 
(mean = 3, range = 0–9 actions), and displayed a similar pat-
tern during the wet-experimental and dry-control conditions 
(mean = 2.13, range = 0–7 actions; see Table S1). In the con-
trol conditions, Ron did not spit water into the tube and only 
displayed an average of 0.33 actions (range = 0–2 actions) 
across the top, table, and wet-control trials.
Discussion
One of the two successful orangutans, Dahi, was able to 
spontaneously solve the opaque version of the FPT without 
any visual feedback. The solution (i.e., collecting water from 
the faucet and pouring it into the tube) appeared suddenly 
after a period of active but unsuccessful exploration, and was 
only used to lift the peanut out of the tube (comparison with 
control conditions). More importantly, in his first encounter 
with the opaque task, Dahi spat water into the tube a total 
of four times even though none of the spits produced vis-
ible changes in the peanut’s position until it finally reached 
the tube’s hole. In other words, his spitting behavior was 
not maintained by differential reinforcement (i.e., repeating 
those actions that bring the peanut incrementally closer to 
the top). This provides evidence for the first time that oran-
gutans can solve the FPT without relying on sensorimotor 
learning, and it may indicate that orangutans may be capable 
of mentally anticipating the solution to the problem.
Despite being an intuitive problem, which does not 
require a complex and artificial sequence of actions, solving 
the FPT has proved to be highly difficult for both human and 
nonhuman primates, as well as other species (e.g., Bird and 
Emery 2009; Ebel et al. 2019a; Hanus et al. 2011). In fact, 
the proportion of successful human and nonhuman individu-
als is typically modest. Its difficulty rests, at least, on two 
main features. First, water is rarely used for instrumental 
purposes among the tested species, and its nature consid-
erably departs from that of typical tools (liquid vs. solid); 
consequently, its use implies a different kind of means-end 
coordination. Second, the water has a strong a priori func-
tion (i.e., satiating thirst). This latter aspect has to do with 
functional fixedness, in the words of Shettleworth (2012), 
“the enemy of [mental] restructuring” (p. 218). Functional 
fixedness refers to a persistent reliance on past experience 
with a particular object in a consistent and specific way that 
precludes an unusual use of such object. One study sug-
gests that this phenomenon may be responsible for so many 
great apes failing the FPT (Hanus et al. 2011; see also Ebel 
et al. 2021 for evidence of functional fixedness in other prob-
lem-solving contexts). Considering all this, our orangutan 
showed a sophisticated representational capacity while using 
water as a tool.
The only previous study of 24 naïve chimpanzees that 
has used the same opaque version of the FPT failed to find 
positive results (Ebel et al. 2019b). Although our findings 
should be taken very cautiously due to the limited sample 
size (n = 2), this interspecies difference is surprising as both 
chimpanzees and orangutans are known to show high inno-
vation rates. Perhaps the orangutans’ unique socioecology, 
life history, and arboreal lifeway prepares this species for a 
stronger preference for exploring and using objects with the 
mouth (e.g., O’Malley and McGrew 2000). The mothers’ 
arboreal lifestyle forces their infants to use their hands to 
cling onto them and to use their mouth to explore the envi-
ronment (Schuppli et al. 2021). These natural predisposi-
tions could generate richer and more complex sensorimotor 
schemes which may have favored the emergence of novel 
oral actions in the FPT context. Yet, considering the ensem-
ble of FPT studies, the number of successful subjects in 
both chimpanzees and orangutans may have been too small 
to detect species differences.
At the very least, these findings indicate that success (or 
failure) in the FPT cannot be reduced to between-species 
differences. Indeed, the current study together with the pre-
vious FPT studies show substantial individual differences in 
performance within the species tested. A growing literature 
on nonhuman (and human) innovation consistently shows 
high rates of individual variability in innovative problem-
solving that results from many sources (see Reader et al. 
2016 for a review). One of the key predictors for success 
is the subject’s motivation to engage in the problem that is 
generally operationalized as both the latency to approach 
the task and the number of task-directed actions (Griffin and 
Suez 2014). Although our study design does not allow us 
to identify the potential contributors to the inter-individual 
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variation observed, our results are consistent with this find-
ing: the withdrawn subject never approached the experi-
mental setup; and the differences in performance between 
the two successful orangutans mirrored their differences 
in active exploration of the task. The potential causes for 
these inter- and intra-individual differences in motivation 
are nevertheless unknown. Undoubtedly, the study of indi-
vidual variability is a promising way to shed further light on 
the mechanisms underpinning innovative problem-solving 
across species (Kuczaj 2017).
The other successful individual, Ron, eventually got the 
peanut in the first trial of the original version of the FPT 
(wet-experimental condition) and was able to transfer this 
solution to the more demanding transparent version after a 
single trial. Also, he discriminated between experimental 
and control conditions, and only directed his spitting behav-
iors to lift the peanut out of the tube. Although we cannot 
conclude, in line with previous findings, that this subject 
innovated by means of mental combinations, the behavioral 
pattern displayed by Ron was similar to that of Dahi in the 
opaque condition, i.e., sudden appearance of the solution and 
exponential time decrease at getting the reward across tri-
als, once the solution had been discovered. These data lend 
further support to the hypothesis that even when perceptual-
motor feedback is available, great apes’ problem-solving 
skills seem to go beyond the scope of basic sensorimotor 
processes, and presumably rely on a basic understanding of 
the means-end relationship involved.
In conclusion, the present study shows for the first time 
that orangutans can potentially mentally generate the correct 
solution for the FPT without receiving visual information 
about the effect of pouring water into the tube to extract the 
peanut. This depends on some understanding of the means-
end relationship involved. However, it is unclear whether 
the orangutans’ knowledge about the task is encoded as 
procedural or practical representations (in terms of “what 
causes the peanut reach the top of the tube”) or as abstract 
knowledge (in terms of “how the peanut reaches the top of 
tube”) (Seed and Mayer 2017). To further shed light on this 
question, more tests of the opaque version of the FPT with 
naïve orangutans and other great ape species (especially, 
chimpanzees) are needed. Those tests should systematically 
manipulate the causal properties involved (e.g., presenting 
rewards that do not float) to gain insights on the nature of 
great apes’ innovative problem-solving.
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